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CONSERVATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
With the avowed purpose of fulfilling the pledges contained in
the Republican platform upon which he was elected, the Presi-
dent of the United States, early in the year, recommended to the
favorable consideration of Congress "measures for the conserva-
tion of the public domain,. for the reclassification of lands accord-
ing to their greatest utility, and the vesting of power in the execu-
tive to dispose of coal, phosphate, oil and mineral lands and of
water power sites in such a way as to prevent their monopoly and
union of ownership in syndicate or combination." The measures
so recommended provide for (i) the leasing of coal, phosphate, oil
and other mineral lands upon a royalty basis, with provisions
designed to prevent monopoly and to insure diligence in the work-
ing and development of the same; (2) the leasing of water power
sites situate on the public lands upon either a royalty or a rental
basis, with provisions designed to prevent monopoly and to insure
early development, diligent utilization under competitive condi-
tions, and the regulation of the prices of the power produced;.
and (3) the reclamation by the United States of its arid public
lands. More recently the President has expressed his approval of
a measure the purpose of which is to provide for the conveyance
by the United States of the water power sites to the States wherein
they are situate, upon two conditions, the first being that the State,
in disposing of such sites, shall retain such control that it may
periodically adjust the rates at which power is to be furnished to
the public by the grantee of the power site; and the second being
that the site shall not be disposed of by the State to any person
having a monopoly of the water power in the vicinity.
It is the purpose of the writer to consider how far the proposed
legislation is consistent with the Constitution, and in what respects
it is repugnant thereto.
That it is within the power of Congress to enact laws designed
to accomplish all of the above mentioned purposes within the
territories, the District of Columbia, and "all places purchased by
the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall
be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and
other needful buildings" will not be questioned. For, over all
such places, the United States has complete sovereignty and
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jurisdiction and Congress possesses the exclusive power of legis-
lation.
But, within the States, the conditions are essentially different.
For it is the doctrine, settled by great decisions of the Supreme
Court, that the government of the United States is one of
enumerated powers and can exercise within the States only such
powers as are actually granted to it by the Constitution either
expressly or by necessary implication. The rule of construction
declared by Chief Justice Marshall in M'Culloch v. Maryland,1
has ever since been recognized as the criterion by which the con-
stitutionality of Acts of Congress ought to be judged, viz:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which areplainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist-
ent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution are constitutional."
This doctrine that the government of the United States is one
of enumerated and limited powers was placed -beyond the realm
of reasonable controversy by the tenth amendment of the Constitu-
tion which is as follows:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution. nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively or to the people."
This, then, is the question to be considered: Are the avowed
ends of the proposed legislation fairly and legitimately within the
scope of the Constitution, and, if so, are the means to be employed
appropriate to the accomplishment of those ends and consistent
.with the letter and spirit of the Constitution? The principal ends
of the proposed legislation appear to be (i) the prevention of
monopoly in the production of coal, phosphate, oil and other
minerals in common use, and in the production and sale of electric
power; (2) the regulation of the price of electric power; and
(3) the reclamation of arid public lands.
There is no express provision in the Constitution conferring
upon Congress the power to regulate either the mining industry
or the power industry, or to prohibit monopoly therein. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the general power to
preserve the public peace and the public morals, to protect the
lives, health and property of the citizens, and to regulate their
social, industrial and commercial relations in respect to all matters,
14 Wheat 316.
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save those over which jurisdiction has been conferred upon the
United States or prohibited to the States, is vested in the several
States. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
United States v. E. C. Knight Company 2 is, together with its
decisions in other cases therein cited, sufficient authority for the
proposition that Congress, even under its broad and comprehen-
sive power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, can not
go to the extent of regulating the manufacture and production of
even those things which are destined and intended to become the
subject matter of such commerce. Congress clearly has not the
power to prohibit or deal with monopoly, or to regulate prices of
commodities or charges for services iii matters that are not fairly
within the scope of commerce between the States, with foreign
nations or with the Indian tribes; and neither the production of
coal, oil and other minerals, nor the generation of electric power
is a part of such commerce. That the power of the United States
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce does not include the
right to interfere with the appropriation or use of any waters
within the States, except so far as may be necessary to prevent
interference with or obstruction of navigable waters capable of
being used as the means or instrumentalities of such commerce, is
established by the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of
the United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company,
3
and Kansas v. Colorado.4
The only provision in the Constitution which has been or can
be invoked to support the proposed conservation legislation is the
following, which occurs in Section 3 of Article IV, viz:
"The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States."
The determination of the question at issue, therefore, depends
upon the true construction and interpretation of -this clause.
This clause of the Constitution undoubtedly confers upon Con-
gress the right to prescibe how, to whom and upon what terms
and conditions the public lands of the United States may be sold
or otherwise disposed of. Such lands are exempt from State
taxation and the United States may exercise in respect to them the
rights of an ordinary private proprietor. It also appears to be
2156 U. S. 1.
3 174 U. S. 690.
4206 U. S. 46.
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the accepted opinion that Congress may exercise over such lands
a power analogous to the police power of the States so long as
such power is directed solely to the protection of the proprietary
rights of the United States therein. These propositions are sup-
ported by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Van Brocklin v.
Anderson,5 and Camfield v. United States.8
But the ownership by the United States of public lands situate
within any State does not involve or carry with it any general or
exclusive jurisdiction or power of legislation over such lands or
their occupants. On the contrary, subject only to the right of the
United States to provide for the sale or other disposition of the
public lands and to make such rules and regulations concerning
the same as may be required for the exercise, enjoyment and pro-
tection of its proprietary rights therein, each State possesses the
same power of legislation and jurisdiction over the public lands
of the United States situate within its boundaries as over lands
held in private ownership by its own citizens.7
The right to reclaim its arid public lands seems to be fairly in-
cluded within the scope of the proprietary rights of the United
States and, when exercised for the purpose of fitting such lands
for sale to settlers, should be deemed to be within the authority
granted to Congress, although it is unquestionably true, as was
decided in the case of Kansas v. Colorado, supra, that the United
States has no jurisdiction or power of legislation over the general
subject of the reclamation of arid lands within the States. It
would also seem that Congress, in the exercise of its power to
dispose of the public lands, may authorize the leasing of mineral
or other lands for limited periods upon a royalty or rental basis.
In fact, in the early case of United States v. Gratiot, the power
of Congress to authorize the leasing of lead mines upon the public
land was upheld.
When the Constitution was adopted the only territory belonging
to the United States consisted of the public lands that had been
ceded by some of the original States. Subsequently other public
lands were ceded to the United States by others of the original
States. The object of the cession in every instance was, in addi-
5117 U. S. 151.
6 167 U. S. 518.
7 Fort Leavenworth Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525; Chicago,
Rock Island, etc., Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542; Ward v. Race Horse,
163 U. S. 504, and Kansas v. Colorado, supra.
3 14 Pet. 526.
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tion to the settlement of controversies concerning their owner-
ship, to enable the United States to convert such lands into money
to be used for the payment of the national debt and eventually
to provide for the formation of new States to be admitted into the
Union.
The clause of the Constitution granting to Congress the power
to dispose oi and to make regulations concerning the territory of
the United States immediately follows the clause by which Con-
gress is granted the power to admit new States into the Union, and
should, I think, especially when considered in the light of history,
be interpreted and construed, not only as granting the power,
but also as imposing upon Congress the duty to dispose of the
public lands of the United States to intending settlers so that new
States may be erected and admitted into the Union. This duty it
is true is political in its nature and of imperfect obligation; but
it should nevertheless be recognized and performed by Congress.
Views very similar to those here advanced were expressed by
the Supreme Court in the leading case of Pollard et al. v. Hagan
et al.,9 and the practical construction placed upon this clause of
the Constitution by Congress as deduced from its legislation is in
full accord with my contention.
The proposed conservation legislation, so far as it relates to the
leasing of coal, phosphate, oil and other mineral lands, although
it is in form an exercise of the power of the United States to
provide for the disposition of the public lands in which such
minerals exist, is really repugnant to the spirit of the Constitu-
tion for two reasons: first, because it contemplates the perpetual
ownership by the United States of lands which are not required
for the exercise of any of its governmental powers or duties, and
which, as we have seen, it is the duty of Congress (although a
* political duty of imperfect obligation) to dispose of so that they
may become private property, and subject in all respects to the
jurisdiction and' sovereignty of the States in which they are
situate; and, second, because the real object sought to be attained
by this legislation is the indirect control by Congress, by means of
covenants and conditions to be inserted in the leases, of certain
productive industries the right to regulate vhich is vested, not in
Congress, but in the legislatures of the several States. If this
legislation shall be adopted, it will inevitably give rise to conflicts
between laws enacted by the several States in the exercise of their
93 How. 212.
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acknowledged constitutional powers for the purpose of prevent-
ing monopoly and regulating the conduct of these industries, on
the one hand, and, on the other hand, the conditions and covenants
of the leases by means of which the executive officers of the
United States, acting under the authority of this legislation, will
attempt to regulate and control the same industries. The ends
sought to be accomplished are neither fairly nor legitimately with-
in the scope of the Constitution, and consequently the enactment
of the proposed measures would be a plain perversion of the
power of Congress to dispose of the public lands of the United
States.
To an adequate understanding of the relation to the Constitu-
tion of the proposed legislation concerning the disposition and
control of the water power sites, a knowledge of the existing law
relating to water and its use and the existing law relating to the
business of generating electric power by means of hydro-electric
plants and its distribution and sale to the public for light, heat and
power purposes is essential.
Each State possesses absolute title to all water in the streams,
rivers, lakes and other bodies of water, whether navigable or non-
navigable, situate within its boundaries, and also possesses the
legislative power of regulating the use of all such water, subject,
first, to such private proprietary rights therein as have been
acquired by natural persons and private and public corpora-
tions; second, to such private proprietary rights therein as
have been acquired by the United States in its proprietary capacity
either by virtue of its ownership of riparian lands or by appr-
•priation; and, third to the right of the United States to regulate
the use of navigable streams and waters as means of commerce
with foreign nations and among the several States and with the
Indian tribes. Each State also possesses the legislative power of
determining, subject only to the duty of protecting vested rights.
what rights of a proprietary nature may be acquired in its waters
by natural persons and corporations. The private proprietary
rights above mentioned, whether held by natural persons, private
or public corporations, or by the United States, are all
usufructuary in their nature and subject in large measure to the
States' legislative power of regulation and control. The public
right of the United States to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, among the several States and with the Indian tribes, does
not include the right to prohibit or regulate any use of water
within a State by or under the authority of that State unless such
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use naturally, fairly and directly tends to obstruct or in some
manner to interfere with the navigability of some stream, lake or
other body of water which is capable of being used as a means by
which such commerce may be carried on. These propositions are,
in the writer's opinion, abundantly supported by the authorities in
the margin.10
The use of water appropriated for sale and distribution to the
public is, by the laws of the State of California and of some of
the other States, a public use subject to legislative regulation in
general and in particular to the power of the State and its political
subdivisions by or under the authority of law to prescribe the
rates to be charged by the appropriators to the public for its use."
It has also been generally held by the courts, in both the Eastern
and Western States, that the generation of electric power for dis-
tribution and sale to the public is a public use or enterprise and
that water used for that purpose is devoted to a public use.
1 2
That States may regulate the business of generating, distributing
and selling electric power to the public and prescribe from time
to time the rates which may be charged to the public for such
power, necessarily follows as a legal consequence from the fact
that the business itself is of a public nature and the property used
in conducting it is devoted to a public use. This proposition is
supported by a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States of which it is only necessary* to cite Munn v.
Illinois.3 A further consequence of the fact that the generation,
distribution and sale of electric power to the public is a public use
is that lands, rights of way, private rights to the use of water and
all other private property necessary for serving that use may be
10 Hudson County Water Company v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349; Mc-
Carter v. Hudson County Water Company, 70 N. J. Equity 695, 14 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 197; U. S. v. Mission Rock Company, 189 U. S. 391; Martin v.
Lessee of Waddell, 16 Peters 367; Munford v. Wardell, 6 Wall. 423;
Pollard v. Hagen, 3 How. 212; Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Min.
Co., 18 Fed. 753; United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co.,
174 U. S. 690; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 85-95, and the cases col-
lected in a note in 50 L. R. A. on pages 757, et seq.
11 Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 158-161;
Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land and Irrigation Co., 188 U. S. 545, 555-6;
Spring Valley Water Works v. San Francisco, 82 Cal. 286; Crtw v. San
Joaquin and Kings River Canal and Irrigation Co., 130 Cal. 309.
12 Walker v. Shasta Power Co., 160 Fed. 856, 859, and the cases there-
in cited.
1394 U. S. 113.
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condemned and taken.by or under the authority of the States by
virtue of their eminent domain.1 4
That the public lands of the United States which have not been
devoted by it to any public or governmental use.are subject to the
eminent domain of the States, and that under this .power all or
any of the so-called water power sites which may be required for
the construction and operation of hydro-electric plants may be
condemned and taken, are positions which, in- the writer's opinion,
are well suported by. reason and to some extent by authority."5
This seems to have been doubted by Mr. Justice Gray in the
opinion of the Court rendered by him in the case of Van Brocklin
v. Tennessee.1 s But the ground of Mr. Justice Gray's doubt
apears to have been removed by the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of South Carolina v United States," wherein the
rights of a proprietary nature belonging to a State are distin-
guished from governmental or public rights. If the United
States may, as declared by -the Supreme Court in the last men-
tioned case, levy taxes upon State agents in respect of a private
business which they are transacting solely as State officers and for
the benefit of the State, there seems to be little reason to doubt
that the States, in the exercise of their power of eminent domain,
may condemn for public use lands which are held by the United
States in its purely proprietary capacity.
There is another legal consequence of the public nature of the
business of generating, distributing and selling electric power to
the public which is of very great importance in considering the
constitutionality of the proposed conservation legislation. The
.corporations engaged in this business are, in a just and true
sense, instrumentalities employed by the State governments to
perform various public and quasi-public duties. The electric
generating and distributing plants used for lighting cities and
towns and furnishing power for the operation of railroads, for
the reclamation of arid lands and the draining of swamp and over-
flowed lands, and for many other industrial uses are public utili-
ties similar in character to railroads, telegraph and telephone sys-
tems and municipal water supply systems. The right to conduct
a public business of this character is a franchise which can be
14 Walker v. Shasta Power Company, supra.
25Lewis on Eminent Domain (second editon), section 264 and the
cases thereii cited.
is 117 U. S. 151.
17 199 U. S. 437.
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obtained only by a grant from the State by or under the authority
of its laws. In exactly the same sense banking corporations
organized under the laws of the United States to aid in conducting
the fiscal operations of the government, and railroad corporations
organized under Acts of Congress for the purpose of conducting
interstate commerce and transporting the armies, military and
other supplies and the mails of the United States are govern-
mental agencies of the United States; and, to the extent that such
banking and railroad corporations act as such agencies, it is
established by many judicial decisions that they and their property
and franchises are not subject to taxation, regulation or control
by the several States. It is also settled by decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States that the United States has
not the power to interfere with the States or their political sub-
divisions or agencies in the exercise of any of their political or
governmental powers, nor the power to levy taxes upon or to reg-
ulate the exercise of franchises granted by the several States.
If Congress should enact a statute regulating the use of the
waters belonging to the several States or their inhabitants for
private purposes, or for any public use except navigation; or a
statute regulating or prQhibiting monopoly in the business of
generating, distributing and selling electric power for either
private or public uses; or imposing a tax or other charge on a
franchise granted by a State for furnishing electric power to the
public; or a statute declaring (khen or how the several States
should exercise their power to prescribe rates for the sale of
electric power, or their power to regulate or forbid monopoly in
its production or sale, such a statute would clearly be uncon-
stitutional. Yet such a statute would not, either in its purpose
or in its legal consequences, differ substantially from the proposed
conservation measures relating to the water power sites. The
ends sought to be accomplished are not within the scope of the
Constitution; and, for Congress to enact the pending measures
would be to avail itself of the purely fortuitous circumstance that
certain power sites are situate on the public lands of the United
States as a means for the usurpation of powers which, under the
Constitution, belong to the States.
The bill providing for the conveyance of the water power
sites to the several States upon the conditions herein before
specified is no less objectionable in principle than the measures
first proposed. This bill involves an attempt on the part of Con-
gress to dictate to the States when and how they shall exercise
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their power of regulating rates for the sale of electric power, and
how and by what means they shall exercise their power to regulate
and control and to prohibit monopoly in the business of generat-
ing, distributing and selling electric power to the public.
The underlying motive of the proposed conservation legislation,
and particularly the measures which concern the water power sites,
is a profound distrust of the capacity of the State governments
to govern their internal affairs with wisdom and justice, and an
assumption of superior wisdom and virtue on the part of the
national government. But whether or not this distrust is well
founded, the ends sought to be accomplished are not fairly or
legitimately within the scope of the Constitution, and the means
proposed for their attainment are repugnant to its letter and
spirit. William B. Bosley.
San Francisco, Cal.
